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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
VERNON RENTZ, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20050707-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
AN EXCEPTION SHOULD BE MADE TO THE BARRING 
OF THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
TO PROBATION REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS 
A. The State Misstates the Facts. 
In the Brief of Appellee^ the State1 misstates the facts 
when it says that, at the time Teschini effectuated the stop 
of Appellant's vehicle, he "had by then been informed that 
defendant was Anot supposed to have a gun.'" Brief of 
Capitalized terms not specifically defined herein are 
afforded the same meaning given them on Appellant's Opening 
Brief. 
Appellee, P. 4; R79 at p. 28. Teschini actually testified 
that he had only received this information from Phillips. He 
later testified that he had no actual knowledge that Appellant 
was on probation, that he had no reason to believe he should 
not have a gun, that he was unaware of any law being violated 
when he executed the second stop of the vehicle. Id. 
B. Circumstances Justifying an Exception Exist. 
The State argues that the Appellant is seeking a bad 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Brief of Appellee 
at p. 5. The State misunderstands Appellant's argument. 
Appellant is not seeking a bad faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. Exceptions can be made to every rule 
depending on the set of circumstances that are being applied 
to that rule. Laws and rules are continually changing. The 
law is not a perfect science, requiring rules to be applied 
differently to different cases. Every case and every set of 
circumstances differs from every other. 
Appellant is simply seeking an exception to the 
exclusionary rule. Appellant is not arguing that Teschini 
necessarily acted in "bad faith," as it is typically known. 
Appellant has relied upon cases involving bad faith in the 
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opening brief as examples to show that exceptions have been 
made to the barring of the exclusionary rule to probation 
revocation proceedings. Additionally, absent any cause for 
the stop, there is no definable way to articulate the actions 
of Teschini without touching on "bad faith" as a possibility. 
Appellant simply requests that this Court address cases with 
unique circumstances, realizing that exceptions may need to be 
made regarding the applicability of the exclusionary rule to 
probation revocation hearings. 
Law that is applied one way to the previous set of 
circumstances may have to be applied a little differently to 
the next set of circumstances, if it is warranted, because 
there may be enough differences in the circumstances that if 
the law is applied that same, an individual's rights may be 
violated. Every set of circumstances needs to be evaluated 
independently to determine whether it warrants some kind of an 
exception. If a set of circumstances warrants it, an 
exception to the barring of the exclusionary rule from 
probation revocation proceedings should be made to protect the 
basic constitutional rights of the public. In the instant 
matter, the public's constitutional rights are at risk because 
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a trial court upheld an illegal stop effectuated with 
absolutely no cause, and an Officer now believes he is 
justified in effectuating a stop given these circumstances. 
The State argues that "neither Scott nor Jarman permits 
exclusion of evidence on a showing of police bad faith." 
Brief of Appellee at p. 5. Appellant does not dispute this 
statement; however, neither Scott nor Jarman contains facts 
analyzing whether an exception such as the instant one should 
be made. In Scott, the defendant's home was searched while on 
probation and weapons were recovered, while in Jarman the 
defendant was required to submit to drug testing as part of 
his probation, one of which came back positive. Both of these 
cases are distinguishable based on the fact that their 
probation status was known. Additionally, both searches were 
conducted based on their probation status. Here, Teschini 
testified that he did not know Rentz was on probation and he 
was not effectuating a probation search. 
Based on the unique facts of the instant matter, an 
exception should be made to the rules that were established 
under Jarman and Scott. Neither Jarman nor Scott addressed 
the issue of whether an exception should be made in 
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circumstances where a police officer has no reasonable 
suspicion or cause to effectuate a stop and search of a 
vehicle. Neither of them dealt with circumstances warranting 
their respective defendants to successfully argue in favor of 
an exception in their particular cases. Cases setting 
precedents, such as in Scott and Jarman, do not always address 
possible exceptions if none are challenged in the matter. 
Once again, rules in the legal realm are ever evolving and 
different circumstances require that they be tailored to the 
circumstances presented. The circumstances of this matter 
require analysis of the rules to determine if they should be 
applied differently than they were to the set of circumstances 
in Scott. Jarman, or any other case* 
Under the unique circumstances of the instant matter, an 
exception should be made to the rules under Scott and Jarman 
and the exclusionary rule should apply to probation revocation 
proceedings to protect an individual's basic constitutional 
rights. If the facts of this case were similar to Scott or 
Jarman, then there would be no need for further analysis. 
However, the facts in this case are unique and different from 
Scott and Jarman and an exception is in order to protect 
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Appellant's basic constitutional rights, as well as those of 
the general public. 
C. Appellant Adequately Preserved the Issues at Trial. 
Next, the State argues in the Brief of Appellee that 
Appellant did not preserve the issue of "bad faith," Brief of 
Appellee at p. 6. As argued supra, Appellant's argument in 
his opening brief is not an argument of "bad faith, " as it is 
typically known, but rather one of reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause, which was in fact preserved at the probation 
revocation hearing. Appellant's trial counsel specifically 
asked the court near the conclusion of the hearing if it was 
going to make any determinations as to the reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause issues and the trial court 
declined to do so, only articulating that, "I think it's a 
real close question on whether there was reasonable 
suspicion." R79 at p. 34. The trial court had its 
opportunity to hear the issues and declined to do so. If this 
issue is best determined by the trial court, remand is 
warranted for such determination. Appellant, however, 
believes the record is adequate for a determination of 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause by this Court. 
6 
In the opening brief, Appellant argued that Teschini 
testified he did not believe that the Appellant had violated 
the law by possessing a firearm when he stopped him the second 
time, Teschini even articulated that he did not know the 
Appellant was on probation and that this was the first time he 
had ever met him. R79 at p. 16, 27. Teschini specifically 
stated in his testimony that he did not stop Appellant the 
second time for any violation of the law and that, when he 
located the gun, he simply took it for safekeeping. R79 at p. 
28. Through simple analysis of this argument, it is 
axiomatic that Appellant's challenge is to the lack of 
reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. See, Brief of 
Appellant at Argument 1(B). When coupled with the unlawful 
search conducted following the unlawful stop, it is clear that 
this is a matter supportive of suppression of the evidence 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
D. Teschini's Actions Violated Appellant7s Basic 
Constitutional Rights. 
Appellant argues in his opening brief that Teschini could 
not have acted in good faith, because there was no reasonable 
suspicion or cause for him to stop the Appellant's vehicle the 
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second time, let alone confiscate his firearm. Stopping a 
vehicle without the requisite reasonable suspicion and 
confiscating a firearm without reason to believe it is 
unlawful for the individual to be in possession of one also 
causes a violation of the person's constitutional right to 
bear arms. U. S. CONST. AMEND. II states that, ''[a] well 
regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall 
not be infringed." If officers believe they can confiscate an 
individual's firearm without any reasonable suspicion or 
cause, based only upon information from someone else that they 
possessed a gun, and our trial courts are willing to uphold 
such action, then the public is at great risk of having their 
Second Amendment rights discarded entirely. 
At the time Appellant was stopped a second time, Teschini 
was unaware of Appellant's probationary status. Teschini's 
belief was that Appellant was no different than an average 
citizen not on probation; however, Teschini still effectuated 
a stop without reasonable suspicion, and confiscated 
Appellant's weapon. No one should have both their Fourth 
Amendment rights to be free from unlawful searches and 
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seizures and their Second Amendment right to bear arms 
infringed upon simply because someone believes they have a gun 
and informs the police. These rights are basic to our 
Constitution and should be upheld in circumstances such as the 
instant matter. 
B. Objective Evidentiary Justification is Required by 
the Constitution. 
In State v. Naiarno, this Court states that courts 
should "...zealously ^guard against police conduct which is 
overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal 
security without the objective evidentiary justification which 
the Constitution requires.'" 2005 UT App 311, II 21-22, 118 
P.3d 285 citing Terrv at 15, 88 S.Ct. 1868. A stop cannot be 
performed without objective evidentiary justification. If 
officers are allowed to initiate these types of stops, then 
the rights of the public at large are in danger of being 
violated. The public has the right to drive their vehicles 
without worrying that they will be stopped without cause by a 
police officer. No citizen should have to worry that they 
could be stopped by a police officer, and their vehicle 
searched, when they have not violated any laws. The stop in 
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this matter was performed without any objective evidentiary 
justification, as required by the Constitution. Teschini 
testified he had no reason to stop Appellant the second time. 
There was no evidence presented that would have given Teschini 
the objective justification needed to stop the Appellant. 
F. The State Misstates Appellant Counsel's Colloquy at 
Trial. 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State argues that counsel 
for the Appellant conceded at the revocation hearing that he 
had researched whether his client had the right to suppression 
and could find no support for his position2. Brief of 
Appellee p. 7. This is a misstatement. Counsel for the 
Appellant was unaware that the exclusionary rule's 
applicability to probation revocation hearings was even going 
to be challenged3. R7 9 at p. 31. Counsel had researched 
issues surrounding the suppression motion, but had only 
2Counsel recognizes that the representative of the State 
arguing herein was not present at the probation revocation 
hearing and only has the benefit of the cold record. Counsel 
herein, however, was obviously present at the hearing and is 
clarifying what he stated to the trial court regarding the 
research issue. 
3It is important to note that the State apparently did not 
anticipate raising the objection as well, since evidence and 
testimony was presented prior to their having done so. 
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briefly touched on the applicability of the exclusionary rule 
at probation revocation hearings. 
The State did not file any type of response to the 
suppression motion indicating their intent to challenge the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule, so the hearing itself 
was the first opportunity counsel had to address the matter. 
The issue was not raised until the hearing was well under way 
and testimony from Teschini had already been presented. 
Because counsel was unaware that the State intended to 
challenge the applicability of the exclusionary rule, he had 
not conducted comprehensive research on this particular issue. 
This is apparent by the colloquy between counsel and the trial 
court, as follows: 
COUNSEL: And Judge, I wish I could, ah, give you 
some more guidance. I have considered that 
point about whether or not a suppression 
issues is -is appropriate. 
COURT: Didn't find any law on it? Huh? 
COUNSEL: I couldn't find anything. And I'd have to 
confess again that I did come to that 
realization later than the first research. 
So I haven't had enough time to do that 
comprehensively. 
R79 at p. 31. The State mistakenly attempts to argue that 
counsel had undertaken comprehensive research on this issue 
and had found nothing. As evidenced by Appellant's opening 
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brief, the issue has now been comprehensively researched, 
after appropriately preserving the issue at the trial court, 
and support for Appellant's position has been presented. 
6. Appellant Seeks Only an Exception to Jarman and 
Remand for a Hearing on the Suppression Issues. 
The State attempts to argue that the Appellant is 
requesting that this Court overrule State v. Jarman, 1999 UT 
App. 269, 987 P.2d 1284. Brief of Appellee at p. 11. The 
State misunderstands the argument in the Appellant's opening 
brief. Appellant is not attempting to overrule Jarman in any 
way, but simply wants an exception made under Jarman for 
matters in which a unique set of circumstances apply. The 
exception argued herein and in Appellant's opening brief 
should be made to Jarman to protect every citizen's 
constitutional rights. Without any exceptions under Jarman, 
it is obvious from the circumstances of this case that there 
is a possibility that very basic constitutional rights can be 
violated. 
If there is no cause for an officer to pull someone over 
initially, but then later it is discovered that they are on 
probation, the evidence needs to be suppressed because there 
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was no cause to stop them in the first place. In Teschini's 
view, Appellant was no different than any ordinary citizen 
driving down the street at the time the stop occurred. In t 
he Appellant's opening brief, Appellant argued extensively 
that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated and his 
suppression motion would have prevailed. Brief of Appellant 
at pp 14-21. The State failed to oppose this issue in the 
Brief of Appellee, although they boldly state therein that the 
issues would fail on their merits. Brief of Appellee p. 9. It 
is obvious that the State has no argument against the 
suppression issue. The trial court even acknowledged that a 
suppression motion, if entertained, would more than likely 
prevail on its merits. R 79 at p. 34. 
At trial, Appellant's counsel was foreclosed from raising 
the reasonable suspicion and probable cause issues by the 
trial court's blanket determination that suppression issues 
were inappropriate in probation revocation hearings. R 79 at 
p. 34. Counsel attempted to have the trial court address the 
reasonable suspicion issue, but the trial court declined to do 
so. Should this Court determine to allow the exception 
requested by Appellant in this matter, Appellant requests that 
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this Court address the suppression issues in its determination 
or remand the matter for a hearing before the trial court on 
the suppression issues, 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's Probation Revocation and Commitment, and remand for a 
new hearing consistent with its holdings. 
DATED this day of April, 2006. 
William L. Schultz 
Attorney for Vernon Rentz 
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this Court address the suppression issues in its determination 
or remand the matter for a hearing before the trial court on 
the suppression issues, 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's Probation Rpvnr.afion and Homini fmpnt, find remand for a 
new hearing consistent with its holdings. 
DATED this /1/66 day of April, 2006. 
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